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141 
LEGISLATING AGAINST LYING 




Political speech receives robust protection under the First Amendment, 
but lying in campaigns and elections is harmful to democracy. In light of 
the former, what can be done about the latter? In the wake of the Supreme 
Court’s 2012 decision in United States v. Alvarez, the answer to the 
question is uncertain. In Alvarez, six Justices supported the conclusion that 
intentional lies are protected under the First Amendment. The decision 
renders existing laws regulating intentionally false campaign and election 
speech extraordinarily vulnerable. 
In the following Essay, I consider three circumstances in which narrowly 
drawn campaign and election speech restrictions are doctrinally defensible. 
The first is when foreign nationals, during a campaign or election, engage 
in intentionally false speech expressly advocating for or against the election 
of a candidate. The second is when intentionally false speech is used to 
undermine election administration. And the third is when a campaign or 
outside political group intentionally falsifies a mandatory disclosure filing. 
Aside from quite limited circumstances such as these, it is exceptionally 
difficult to craft novel campaign and election speech restrictions that can 
survive a First Amendment challenge.  
Introduction 
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA), the cornerstone 
of President Barack Obama’s legislative legacy, exists in both fact and 
fiction. Controversial from its inception, the Act is simultaneously viewed 
as both progressive triumph and tyrannical dictate, and its intent and effects 
have been fantastically mischaracterized. It is fitting, then, that the ACA 
was entangled in the Supreme Court’s most recent case involving 
intentional lies in political campaigns, Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus.
1
  
Steve Driehaus is a former United States Congressman from Ohio.
2
 
Elected in 2008, Driehaus, a Democrat, voted for the ACA.
3
 One of the 
                                                                                                                 
 * Associate Professor of Law, Arizona State University, Sandra Day O’Connor 
College of Law. I received very helpful feedback from Helen Norton, James Weinstein, and 
my junior colleagues at the Sandra Day O’Connor College of Law. 
 1. 134 S. Ct. 2334 (2014). 
 2. Id. at 2339. 
 3. Id. 
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misleading claims made about the ACA is that it includes subsidies for 
elective abortions.
4
 Susan B. Anthony List (SBA), a pro-life advocacy 
organization, distributed advertisements asserting that in voting for the 
ACA, Driehaus advocated for taxpayer-funded abortions.
5
 Driehaus 
perceived the advertisements to be knowingly false and defamatory, and 
filed a complaint with the Ohio Elections Commission, the agency charged 
with enforcing various Ohio election law statutes.
6
  
At the time, one of those statutes criminally prohibited the making of “a 
false statement concerning the voting record of a candidate or public 
official.”
7
 Despite Driehaus losing his 2010 bid for reelection and dropping 
his complaint, the dispute proceeded, with the SBA litigating the narrow 
question of whether it had standing to challenge the constitutionality of the 
false statement statute under the First Amendment.
8
 The Supreme Court 
ultimately found that the SBA’s intention to distribute similar 
advertisements in the future, coupled with a credible threat of future 
enforcement of the false statement statute, was sufficient to establish 
standing.
9
 The statute was ultimately declared unconstitutional by a federal 
district court,
10
 and the SBA continues its efforts in earnest.
11
 
                                                                                                                 
 4. The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act places express prohibitions on the 
use of federal funds for elective abortions. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. 
L. No. 111-148, § 1303, 124 Stat. 119, 170 (2010). President Obama issued an executive 
order expressly enforcing the prohibition on the use of tax credits and cost-sharing reduction 
payments for elective abortions. Segregation of Funds for Abortion Services, 45 C.F.R. § 
156.280 (2012); see also Michelle Ye Hee Lee, Does Obamacare Provide Federal Subsidies 
for Elective Abortions?, WASH. POST (Jan. 26, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
news/fact-checker/wp/2015/01/26/does-obamacare-provide-federal-subsidies-for-elective-
abortions/?utm_term=.25532dff23bd; Alina Salganicoff et al., Coverage for Abortion 
Services and the ACA, HENRY J. KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Sept. 19, 2014), https://www.kff. 
org/womens-health-policy/issue-brief/coverage-for-abortion-services-and-the-aca/ (“The 
ACA reinforces the current Hyde Amendment restrictions, continuing to limit federal funds 
to pay for pregnancy terminations that endanger the life of the woman or that are a result of 
rape or incest.”). 
 5. Driehaus, 134 S. Ct. at 2339. 
 6. Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 805 F. Supp. 2d 412, 414 (S.D. Ohio 2011), 
rev’d, 134 S. Ct. 2334 (2014). 
 7. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3517.21 (West 1995), invalidated by Susan B. Anthony 
List v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 45 F. Supp. 3d 765, 770 (S.D. Ohio 2014). 
 8. Driehaus, 134 S. Ct. at 2340.  
 9. Id. at 2343–47. 
 10. Susan B. Anthony List, 45 F. Supp. 3d at 770.  
 11. See Jessie Hellmann, Anti-abortion Groups Press for Change to ObamaCare Bills, 
THE HILL (Dec. 19, 2017), http://thehill.com/policy/healthcare/365576-anti-abortion-groups-
press-for-change-to-obamacare-bills.  
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Anticlimactically, then, the Supreme Court never squarely addressed the 
question of the statute’s constitutionality, though many legal experts viewed 




One could be forgiven for not knowing that any laws against lying in 
politics exist, given the deluge of inaccuracies peddled by elected (and 
aspiring) government officials these days. But in fact, when Driehaus was 
decided, sixteen states had statutes regulating false campaign speech, 
election speech, or both.
13
 When challenged, however, such laws have not 
fared well.
14
 The results are unsurprising to anyone with a basic knowledge 
of First Amendment doctrine. Political speech is at the core of the First 
Amendment, and as such, enjoys the greatest protection from government 
regulation.
15
 Discussions about the government’s ability to suppress 
                                                                                                                 
 12. See, e.g. The Last Word with Lawrence O’Donnell (MSNBC television broadcast 
Apr. 22, 2014) (interview with Geoffrey R. Stone). A video clip of the Stone interview is 
embedded in an accompanying story on the MSNBC website. See Adam Serwer, Lying in 
Politics Not a Crime?, MSNBC (Apr. 22, 2014), http://www.msnbc.com/msnbc/supreme-
court-susan-b-anthony-list-lying-politics-not-crime. 
 13. See Lyle Denniston, Argument Preview: Attack Ads and the First Amendment, 
SCOTUSBLOG (Apr. 17, 2014, 12:02 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2014/04/argument-
preview-attack-ads-and-the-first-amendment/. 
 14. See, e.g., 281 Care Comm. v. Arneson, 766 F.3d 774, 796 (8th Cir. 2014) (striking a 
Minnesota law criminalizing the dissemination of false information pertaining to ballot 
initiatives, and asserting that “[t]he citizenry, not the government, should be the monitor of 
falseness in the political arena”); Commonwealth v. Lucas, 34 N.E.3d 1242, 1257 (Mass. 
2015) (“We conclude that § 42 cannot be limited to the criminalization of fraudulent or 
defamatory speech, is neither necessary nor narrowly tailored to advancing the 
Commonwealth’s interest in fair and free elections, and chills the very exchange of ideas 
that gives meaning to our electoral system.”).  
 15. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14 (1976) (“Discussion of public issues and debate on 
the qualifications of candidates are integral to the operation of the system of government 
established by our Constitution.”); N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269 (1964) 
(“The general proposition that freedom of expression upon public questions is secured by the 
First Amendment has long been settled by our decisions.”); see also L.A. Powe, Jr., Mass 
Speech and the Newer First Amendment, 1982 SUP. CT. REV. 243, 281 (“It is not so much 
that we retain a naive belief that truth is knowable or that the electorate will rationally 
choose it, as that the simple recognition that no theory requiring people to stop speaking (or 
stop listening) better fits with our traditions than the one we have adopted.”); Geoffrey R. 
Stone, Electoral Exceptionalism and the First Amendment: A Road Paved with Good 
Intentions, 35 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 665, 668 (2011) (“At first blush, of course, 
one might reasonably think that the electoral setting would, if anything, justify even greater 
protection for speech. After all, such speech is fundamentally what the First Amendment is 
about.”).  
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political speech predictably involve analogies to totalitarian regimes and 
references to the classics of George Orwell.
16
  
Are we, therefore, inherently hamstrung in our attempts to superintend 
intentionally false campaign and election speech? Given the distortions in 
the metaphorical marketplace—due to both the stakes of electoral contests 
and the mere volume of messages in circulation
17
—are there compelling 
reasons to regulate campaign and election speech, specifically?
18
 Both of 
these questions are doctrinally complex.  
Certainly, most of us would not countenance blatant attempts to mislead 
voters in campaigns and elections; such efforts are easy to condemn. Yet 
such lies occur “in a context where the countervailing First Amendment 
dangers are unusually acute.”
19
 Those dangers—namely, that speech 
regulations prove ineffective, overbroad, underinclusive, threatening to 
valuable speech, and ripe for partisan abuse—cannot be understated.
20
 
With these considerations in mind, I want to explore three circumstances 
in which narrowly drawn campaign and election speech restrictions are 
doctrinally defensible. The first is when foreign nationals, during a 
campaign or election, engage in intentionally false speech expressly 
advocating for or against the election of a candidate. The rights of foreign 
nationals to participate in campaigns and elections have been considered by 
courts in the campaign finance context.
21
 The regulations upheld in that 
context suggest that the regulation of foreign nationals’ campaign and 
election speech might be sustained on similar grounds. The second 
circumstance is when intentionally false speech is used to undermine 
                                                                                                                 
 16. For instance, Orwell’s “Ministry of Truth” was invoked multiple times in the 
Driehaus oral argument. See GEORGE ORWELL, NINETEEN EIGHTY-FOUR 4 (1949). 
 17. See Sue Halpern, How He Used Facebook to Win, N.Y. REV. BOOKS (June 8, 2017), 
https://www.nybooks.com/articles/2017/06/08/how-trump-used-facebook-to-win/ (“While it 
may not have created individual messages for every voter, the Trump campaign used 
Facebook’s vast reach, relatively low cost, and rapid turnaround to test tens of thousands and 
sometimes hundreds of thousands of different campaign ads.”).  
 18. The most sophisticated exploration of this question is in Frederick Schauer & 
Richard H. Pildes, Electoral Exceptionalism and the First Amendment, 77 TEX. L. REV. 
1803, 1825 (1999) (“[T]he question is whether regulation should be permissible to remedy 
various perceived pathologies of current electoral discourse, even if that same degree of 
government intervention would be impermissible to remedy the parallel pathologies of non-
electoral discourse in roughly comparable situations.”).  
 19. Helen Norton, Lies and the Constitution, 2012 SUP. CT. REV. 161, 199.  
 20. See William P. Marshall, False Campaign Speech and the First Amendment, 153 U. 
PA. L. REV. 285, 297–300 (2004) (summarizing the arguments).  
 21. Bluman v. FEC, 800 F. Supp. 2d 281 (D.D.C. 2011), aff’d, 565 U.S. 1104 (2012).  
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol71/iss1/7





 For instance, falsely and maliciously advising 
prospective voters about polling place locations or about the functionality 
of a voting machine are examples of speech that might be proscribed, given 
the compelling interest the government has in protecting the right to vote. 
And the third circumstance is when a campaign or outside political group 
(such as a political action committee (PAC) or Super PAC)
23
 intentionally 
falsifies a mandatory disclosure filing. Again, campaign finance doctrine is 
instructive, as disclosure requirements have been afforded greater deference 
than either contribution or expenditure limits.
24
 As such, prohibitions on the 
falsification of mandatory disclosure filings would almost certainly survive 
a First Amendment challenge.  
These are three quite limited circumstances, which reflects the First 
Amendment’s broad protection of political speech, even if false or 
misleading. To be sure, other longstanding speech prohibitions function as 
indirect restrictions on electoral speech—lying to a government official, 
defamation, libel, slander, incitement to violence, and so on—and my 
analysis does not require dispensing with or modifying those doctrines. My 
intention is to explore areas where those doctrines can conceivably be 
supplemented. Though dishonesty in politics is more a feature than a bug, 
we can and should work to curb its excesses.  
This Essay proceeds as follows: Part I briefly reviews the doctrine 
involving the right to lie, including the Court’s consequential decision in 
United States v. Alvarez.
25
 Part II examines states’ attempts to regulate false 
campaign and election speech and looks more narrowly at two cases 
following Alvarez involving the right to lie in campaigns and elections. Part 
III explores three circumstances in which lying in campaigns and elections 
can be proscribed: (1) when foreign nationals engage in intentionally false 
speech that includes express advocacy, (2) when intentionally false speech 
is used to undermine election administration, and (3) when a campaign or 
outside political group intentionally falsifies a mandatory disclosure filing.  
                                                                                                                 
 22. See Richard L. Hasen, A Constitutional Right to Lie in Campaigns and Elections, 74 
MONT. L. REV. 53, 71 (2013) (“The strongest case for constitutionality is a narrow law 
targeted at false election speech aimed at disenfranchising voters.”).  
 23. Richard Briffault, Super Pacs, 96 MINN. L. REV. 1644, 1644 (2012) (offering 
definitions). 
 24. See infra Part III; Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 371 (2010) (“The First 
Amendment protects political speech; and disclosure permits citizens and shareholder to 
react to the speech of corporate entities in a proper way.”); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 
75–76 (1976). 
 25. 567 U.S. 709 (2012). 
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I. The First Amendment, the Constitutional Right to Lie, and Alvarez 
When Xavier Alvarez, at the time a member of the Three Valley Water 
Board District in southern California, publicly lied about having received 
the Congressional Medal of Honor,
26
 the doctrinal status of intentional lies 
was uncertain. On occasion, the Supreme Court had suggested that false 
speech was valueless. As stated in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., “there is no 
constitutional value in false statements of fact. Neither the intentional lie 
nor the careless error materially advances society’s interest in ‘uninhibited, 
robust, and wide-open’ debate on public issues.”
27
 Yet in other preeminent 
speech cases, certain passages could be read to provide protection for lies.  
The Court in New York Times v. Sullivan famously held that public 
officials who bring defamation claims against their critics must demonstrate 
not only that the offending speech was false, but that it “was made with 
‘actual malice’—that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless 
disregard of whether it was false or not.”
28
 The announced standard was 
deemed necessary to prevent the chilling of protected speech.
29
 The 
standard was later applied to defamation claims brought by public figures,
30
 
and then to both public officials and public figures seeking damages for the 
intentional infliction of emotional distress.
31
 Given these precedents, 
                                                                                                                 
 26. Alvarez, 567 U.S. at 713.  
 27. 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974); see also Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 389–90 (1967) 
(“[T]he constitutional guarantees can tolerate sanctions against calculated falsehood without 
significant impairment of their essential function. We held in New York Times that calculated 
falsehood enjoyed no immunity in the case of alleged defamation of a public official 
concerning his official conduct.”).  
 28. 376 U.S. 254, 279–80 (1964).  
 29. See Randy J. Kozel, Precedent and Speech, 115 MICH. L. REV. 439, 450 (2017) 
(“The takeaway seemed to be that although falsity disrupts the marketplace of ideas, its 
protection is necessary to avoid chilling truthful speech.”); Marshall, supra note 20, at 306 
(“Sullivan’s reasoning, however, was less about the First Amendment value of falsity . . . 
than it was about providing breathing space for protected expression on grounds that too 
quickly sanctioning falsity would chill public debate.”); Norton, supra note 19, at 169 
(“[F]alse statements are protected by the First Amendment, not because the speech itself is 
valuable, but because government efforts to regulate such speech might chill individuals’ 
willingness to engage in valuable expression.”).  
 30. Curtis Publ’g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 164 (1967) (Warren, C.J., concurring) (“I 
therefore adhere to the New York Times standard in the case of ‘public figures’ as well as 
‘public officials.’ It is a manageable standard, readily stated and understood, which also 
balances to a proper degree the legitimate interests traditionally protected by the law of 
defamation.”).  
 31. Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 56 (1988) (“We conclude that public 
figures and public officials may not recover for the tort of intentional infliction of emotional 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol71/iss1/7
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Alvarez had reason to believe that the Stolen Valor Act (SVA),
32
 the federal 
statute under which he was charged, might be judged unconstitutional. He 
was correct. 
 The SVA stated that anyone who “with intent to obtain money, property, 
or other tangible benefit, fraudulently holds oneself out to be a recipient of 
a decoration or medal described in subsection (c)(2) or (d) shall be fined 
under this title, imprisoned not more than one year, or both.”
33
 There was 
no dispute over whether Alvarez violated the statute; rather, the case turned 
on whether the statute was an impermissible content-based speech 
restriction.
34
 The plurality decision, authored by Justice Kennedy and joined 
by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Ginsburg and Sotomayor, found the 
SVA to lack a “clear limiting principle,”
35
 to “give government a broad 
censorial power unprecedented in this Court’s cases or in our constitutional 
tradition,”
36
 and to fall short of “the Government’s heavy burden when it 
seeks to regulate protected speech.”
37
  
Justice Kennedy emphasized that content-based speech restrictions are 
subject to strict scrutiny and are only justified “when confined to the few 
‘historic and traditional categories [of expression] long familiar to the 
bar.’”
38
 These categories include speech that incites imminent unlawful 
action, obscenity, defamation, speech integral to criminal conduct, child 
pornography, and fraud.
39
 Significantly, the opinion rejected the 
government’s assertion that false speech is “presumptively unprotected,”
40
 
                                                                                                                 
distress by reason of publications such as the one here at issue without showing in addition 
that the publication contains a false statement of fact which was made with ‘actual 
malice.’”).  
 32. 18 U.S.C. § 704 (Supp. II 2014). 
 33. Id. § 704(b).  
 34. United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 715–17 (2012).  
 35. Id. at 723.  
 36. Id.  
 37. Id. at 726 (citing United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 818 
(2000)).  
 38. Id. at 717 (quoting Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims 
Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 127 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring)).  
 39. Id.; see Norton, supra note 19, at 173 (“To date, the categories of expression 
identified by the Court as ‘low value’ include commercial speech, true threats, incitement to 
imminent illegal action, ‘fighting words,’ obscenity, defamation, fraud, child pornography, 
and speech that is integral to criminal conduct.”).  
 40. Alvarez, 567 U.S. at 721–22; see Alan K. Chen & Justin Marceau, High Value Lies, 
Ugly Truths, and the First Amendment, 68 VAND. L. REV. 1435, 1452 (2015) (“Alvarez, then, 
reflects a turning point: an intentional lie of little or no value, which arguably caused some 
harm, was nonetheless deemed protected speech.”).  
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2018
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Justices Breyer and Kagan concurred in the judgment, though unlike the 
plurality they evaluated the SVA under a form of intermediate scrutiny: 
Laws restricting false statements about philosophy, religion, 
history, the social sciences, the arts, and the like raise . . . 
concerns, and in many contexts have called for strict scrutiny. 
But this case does not involve such a law. The dangers of 
suppressing valuable ideas are lower where, as here, the 
regulations concern false statements about easily verifiable facts 
that do not concern such subject matter.
42
 
Nonetheless, Justices Breyer and Kagan found the SVA unique in its 
breadth,
43
 and threatening in its potential to chill protected speech.
44
 And 
despite the SVA’s redeeming purposes (namely, preserving the integrity of 




Justice Alito, in dissent with Justices Thomas and Scalia, viewed the 
SVA as “a narrow statute that presents no threat to the freedom of speech”
46
 
insofar as it covered “only knowingly false statements about hard facts 
directly within a speaker’s personal knowledge.”
47
 Rejecting the plurality’s 
summary of the doctrine, Justice Alito asserted that “[t]ime and again, this 
Court has recognized that as a general matter false factual statements 
possess no intrinsic First Amendment value.”
48
 As such, he claimed, false 
speech may only be afforded First Amendment protection when necessary 
                                                                                                                 
 41. Alvarez, 567 U.S. at 725 (“The link between the Government’s interest in protecting 
the integrity of the military honors system and the Act’s restriction on the false claims of 
liars like respondent has not been shown.”).  
 42. Id. at 731–32 (Breyer, J., concurring).  
 43. Id. at 736 (“[F]ew statutes, if any, simply prohibit without limitation the telling of a 
lie, even a lie about one particular matter.”).  
 44. Id. at 733 (“[A]s the Court has often said, the threat of criminal prosecution for 
making a false statement can inhibit the speaker from making true statements, thereby 
‘chilling’ a kind of speech that lies at the First Amendment’s heart.”).  
 45. Id. at 738 (“[A] more finely tailored statute might, as other kinds of statutes 
prohibiting false factual statements have done, insist upon a showing that the false statement 
caused specific harm or at least was material, or focus its coverage on lies most likely to be 
harmful or on contexts where such lies are most likely to cause harm.”).  
 46. Id. at 739 (Alito, J., dissenting).  
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. at 746. 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol71/iss1/7
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to prevent the chilling of protected speech.
49
 Justice Alito was unconvinced 
that the SVA presented such a concern.
50
  
In sum, in Alvarez, six Justices supported the conclusion that intentional 
lies are protected under the First Amendment. The decision is generally 
understood to constitute a departure from earlier holdings,
51
 and it quite 
clearly renders laws regulating false campaign and election speech 
constitutionally suspect.
52
 I turn to consider those laws in Part II. 
II. Campaign and Election Lies After Alvarez 
Even in the wake of Alvarez, a surprising number of states have laws on 
the books prohibiting false campaign speech, election speech, or both.
53
 The 
laws, though largely unenforced, vary in scope. For example, Alaska 
prohibits the use of false statements “made as part of a telephone poll or an 
organized series of calls, and made with the intent to convince potential 
voters concerning the outcome of an election.”
54
 North Dakota’s statute, 
much broader by comparison, reads as follows: 
                                                                                                                 
 49. Id. at 750.  
 50. Id. at 752 (“In stark contrast to hypothetical laws prohibiting false statements about 
history, science, and similar matters, the Stolen Valor Act presents no risk at all that valuable 
speech will be suppressed.”).  
 51. Erwin Chemerinsky, The First Amendment and the Right to Lie, ABA J. (Sept. 5, 
2012), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/the_first_amendment_and_the_right_to_lie 
(“What makes Alvarez surprising is that the Roberts court had generally rejected free speech 
claims when the institutional interests of the government were at stake, showing deference 
when the restrictions on speech were for the military or in schools or in prisons.”); Chen & 
Marceau, supra note 40, at 1453 (“But, for the first time, the Court also recognized a distinct 
set of lies that warranted protection, and the six Justices who voted to invalidate the law 
fundamentally agreed on the limiting principles that apply in this context.”); Kozel, supra 
note 29, at 450 (“Concerns about continuity played little role in the Alvarez analysis.”).  
 52. Hasen, supra note 22, at 56 (“The result of Alvarez is that laws regulating false 
campaign speech are in even more constitutional trouble than they were before, and any 
attempts to regulate such speech will have to be narrow, targeted, and careful in their choice 
of remedies.”).  
 53. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 15.13.095(a) (2010); COLO. REV. STAT. § 1-13-109 
(2012); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 104.271 (West 2008); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18:1463(C) (2011); 
MISS. CODE. ANN. § 23-15-875 (2007); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-274(A)(8) (2011); N.D. 
CENT. CODE § 16.1-10-04 (2007); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 260.532 (West 2009); S.D. 
CODIFIED LAWS § 12-13-16 (Supp. 2012); TENN. CODE ANN. § 2-19-142 (2003); UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 20a-11-1103 (West 2010); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 42.17a.335 (West 2012); W. 
VA. CODE ANN. § 3-8-11 (West 1995); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 12.05 (West 2004).  
 54. ALASKA STAT. § 15.13.095(a). 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2018
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A person is guilty of a class A misdemeanor if that person 
knowingly, or with reckless disregard for its truth or falsity, 
publishes any political advertisement or news release that 
contains any assertion, representation, or statement of fact, 
including information concerning a candidate’s prior public 
record, which is untrue, deceptive, or misleading, whether on 
behalf of or in opposition to any candidate for public office, 
initiated measure, referred measure, constitutional amendment, 
or any other issue, question, or proposal on an election ballot, 
and whether the publication is by radio, television, newspaper, 
pamphlet, folder, display cards, signs, posters, billboard 




Wisconsin’s statute is far less verbose: “No person may knowingly make or 
publish, or cause to be made or published, a false representation pertaining 




Judged in light of the plurality opinion in Alvarez, each of these statutes 
appears vulnerable.
57
 And unsurprisingly, when challenged, similar statutes 
have met their end. As detailed below, in recent years, campaign and 
election false speech laws have been invalidated in Minnesota and 
Massachusetts. 
A. 281 Care Committee v. Arneson 
Minnesota has long criminalized intentionally false speech about 
political candidates.
58
 In 2004, the Minnesota legislature extended the 
prohibition to speech made “with respect to the effect of a ballot 
question,”
59
 codifying both restrictions in the Minnesota Fair Campaign 
                                                                                                                 
 55. N.D. CENT. CODE § 16.1-10-04. 
 56. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 12.05. 
 57. See Staci Lieffring, Note, First Amendment and the Right to Lie: Regulating 
Knowingly False Campaign Speech After United States v. Alvarez, 97 MINN. L. REV. 1047, 
1056 (2013) (“The holding in Alvarez creates a sizeable hurdle for any law that seeks to 
regulate false speech.”).  
 58. 281 Care Comm. v. Arneson, 638 F.3d 621, 625 (8th Cir. 2011). 
 59. Id. (quoting MINN. STAT. § 211B.06 (2017)). The full text of the statute reads:  
A person is guilty of a gross misdemeanor who intentionally participates in the 
preparation, dissemination, or broadcast of paid political advertising or 
campaign material with respect to the personal or political character or acts of a 
candidate, or with respect to the effect of a ballot question, that is designed or 
tends to elect, injure, promote, or defeat a candidate for nomination or election 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol71/iss1/7





 Two advocacy organizations that opposed 
school-funding ballot initiatives challenged the MFCPA under the First 
Amendment.
61




The court’s detailed analysis of the appropriate standard of review 
considered, yet ultimately rejected, the State’s argument that the MFCPA 
should be judged under intermediate scrutiny.
63
 While acknowledging 
Justice Breyer’s application of intermediate scrutiny in Alvarez,
64
 the court 
determined that intermediate scrutiny is appropriate only when evaluating 
laws proscribing non-political false speech: “The key today, however, is 
that although Alvarez dealt with a regulation proscribing false speech, it did 
not deal with legislation regulating false political speech.”
65
  
After concluding that strict scrutiny was required, the court then found 
the MFCPA to lack the requisite tailoring,
66
 and, in its most damning 
conclusion, to be potentially exploitable for political advantage by liars 
themselves.
67
 Of particular concern to the court was the State’s lack of 
evidence in support of the statute’s necessity. The court critiqued the State’s 
                                                                                                                 
to a public office or to promote or defeat a ballot question, that is false, and that 
the person knows is false or communicates to others with reckless disregard of 
whether it is false. 
MINN. STAT. § 211B.06 (2017). 
 60. 281 Care Comm. v. Arneson, 766 F.3d 774, 777–78 (8th Cir. 2014). 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. at 793 (“Putting in place potential criminal sanctions and/or the possibility of 
being tied up in litigation . . . at the mere whim and mention from anyone who might oppose 
your view on a ballot question is wholly overbroad and overburdensome and chills otherwise 
protected speech.”).  
 63. Id. at 782–84. 
 64. Because Justices Breyer and Kagan provided the fifth and sixth votes in Alvarez, 
their decision to apply intermediate scrutiny constitutes the narrowest, and thus controlling, 
judgment.  
 65. Arneson, 766 F.3d at 783. 
 66. Id. at 787–96. 
 67. Id. at 796 (“[T]he practical application of § 211B.06 only opens the door to more 
fraud. The statute itself actually opens a Pandora’s box to disingenuous politicking itself.”). 
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appeal to “common sense” as a basis for its regulation
68
 and suggested that 
counterspeech was a preferable alternative.
69
 
B. Commonwealth v. Lucas 
The State of Massachusetts similarly attempted to regulate intentionally 
false campaign and election speech in a statute declaring the following: 
No person shall make or publish, or cause to be made or 
published, any false statement in relation to any candidate for 
nomination or election to public office, which is designed or 
tends to aid or to injure or defeat such candidate. 
No person shall publish or cause to be published in any letter, 
circular, advertisement, poster or in any other writing any false 
statement in relation to any question submitted to the voters, 
which statement is designed to affect the vote on said question.
70
 




The statute was challenged by a PAC that published and distributed 
brochures in opposition to a state representative, who in turn brought a 
criminal complaint against the PAC’s chairwoman.
72
 The Supreme Judicial 
Court of Massachusetts, in reliance at times on 281 Care Committee, 
echoed a number of conclusions reached in that case. For one, the court 
found strict scrutiny to be the appropriate standard of review.
73
 The court 
also found it problematic that anyone could initiate a complaint, a feature 
                                                                                                                 
 68. Id. at 790 (“[The] reliance upon ‘common sense’ to establish that the use of false 
statements impacts voters’ understanding, influences votes and ultimately changes elections, 
is not enough on these facts to establish a direct causal link between [the statute] and an 
interest in preserving fair and honest elections.”).  
 69. Id. at 793 (“There is no reason to presume that counterspeech would not suffice to 
achieve the interests advanced and is a less restrictive means, certainly, to achieve the same 
end goal.”). 
 70. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 56, § 42 (2017). 
 71. Id. (“Whoever knowingly violates any provision of this section shall be punished by 
a fine of not more than one thousand dollars or by imprisonment for not more than six 
months.”).  
 72. Commonwealth v. Lucas, 34 N.E.3d 1242, 1245 (Mass. 2015). 
 73. Id. at 1251–52 (“[W]e find it doubtful that the concurring opinion of two justices in 
Alvarez abrogated the well-established line of First Amendment precedent holding that 
content-based restrictions of political speech must withstand strict scrutiny.”).  
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that threatened to “create lingering uncertainties of a criminal investigation 
and chill political speech by virtue of the process itself.”
74
  
Massachusetts had argued that strict scrutiny was unwarranted since the 
speech that its statute proscribed could fairly be characterized as fraud or 
defamation, two categories of speech receiving minimal First Amendment 
protection.
75
 The court was unmoved by these characterizations. As to 
fraud, the court found that most fraud statutes turn on a showing of 
materiality, an element absent in this instance.
76
 Moreover, even if the 




The court found the State’s characterization of the proscribed speech as 
defamatory to be “similarly flawed.”
78
 As noted above, a successful 
defamation claim requires a demonstration of “actual malice.”
79
 The court 
found the statute to exceed the categorical boundaries of defamation: 
“Although [the statute] is capable of reaching such defamatory statements, 
it is also capable of reaching statements regarding ballot questions and 
statements by a candidate about himself designed to enhance his own 
candidacy, i.e., statements that are clearly not defamatory.”
80
 The court 
concluded with a perfunctory endorsement of an open marketplace of 
ideas,
81
 and invalidated the statute under the state constitution.
82
  
Considering Alvarez, 281 Care Committee, and Lucas collectively, it is 
evident that laws prohibiting intentionally false campaign or election 
speech are presumptively unconstitutional. Concerns about chilling political 
speech are too serious to permit doctrinal carve outs that might be perceived 
                                                                                                                 
 74. Id. at 1247.  
 75. Va. Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976) 
(illustrating the fraud example); Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952) (illustrating the 
defamation example).  
 76. Lucas, 34 N.E.3d at 1249 (“[The statute] plainly does not require a showing of 
reliance or damage.”). 
 77. Id. (“Thus, the fact that [the statute] may reach fraudulent speech is not dispositive, 
because it also reaches speech that is not fraudulent.”). 
 78. Id.  
 79. See supra Part I. 
 80. Lucas, 34 N.E.3d at 1250. 
 81. Id. at 1256 (“Thus, in the election context, as elsewhere, it is apparent ‘that the 
ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas—that the best test of truth is the 
power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market, and that truth is 
the only ground upon which [the people’s wishes safely can be carried out.’” (quoting Lyons 
v. Globe Newspaper Co., 612 N.E.2d 1158, 1164 (Mass. 1993)).  
 82. Id. at 1257. 
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as gag orders. And we understandably fear a regulatory slippery slope.
83
 
Are, then, speech regulations of intentionally false campaign and election 
lies categorically impermissible? In the next Part, I consider three 
circumstances in which I believe such lies can be proscribed. 
III. Regulating Campaign and Election Lies: Three Possibilities 
As committed as we are to protecting political speech, whether true or 
false, there are limited circumstances in which we might justifiably delimit 
intentionally false campaign and election lies. I posit three circumstances 
below. The first is when foreign nationals, during a campaign or election, 
engage in intentionally false speech expressly advocating for or against the 
election of a candidate. The second is when intentionally false speech is 
used to undermine election administration. And the third is when a 
campaign or outside political group intentionally falsifies a mandatory 
disclosure filing.  
A. Foreign Nationals and the Right to Lie in Campaigns and Elections 
Federal law prohibits “foreign nationals” from contributing any “money 
or other thing of value” to political candidates—in federal, state, or local 
elections—and to political parties.
84
 It also prohibits foreign nationals from 
making “an expenditure, independent expenditure, or disbursement for an 
electioneering communication.”
85
 Importantly, an “electioneering 
communication” is a communication that expressly advocates for the 
election of a particular candidate, or is functionally equivalent to such a 
communication, and is targeted towards the electorate.
86
 Foreign nationals 
are defined as individuals who are neither citizens of the United States nor 
lawful permanent residents of the United States.
87
  
As background, in the Supreme Court’s landmark ruling in Buckley v. 
Valeo, political contributions were distinguished from political 
                                                                                                                 
 83. Stone, supra note 15, at 676 (“If the government can regulate speech in the electoral 
context without meeting the ordinary requirements of the First Amendment merely because 
it maintains that such restrictions will improve the process, then there is nothing to prevent it 
from demanding a similar exception for speech restrictions that it claims would improve 
public debate more generally.”); see also Hasen, supra note 22, at 56 (“The government also 
might make mistakes in ferreting out the truth and ironically lead voters to make wrong 
decisions.”).  
 84. 52 U.S.C. §§ 30121(a)(1)(A)–(B) (2012).  
 85. Id. § 30121(a)(1)(C).  
 86. FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, 551 U.S. 449, 476–82 (2007). 
 87. 52 U.S.C. § 30121(b). 
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 The simplest example of the former is a monetary donation 
made to a candidate or political party. The latter is money spent, 
independent of any candidate or political party, to influence an election. 
Thus, money given to a Super PAC would fall in this category.  
Contributions are understood to constitute a form of speech and can be 
restricted because they present a risk of corruption (that is, quid pro quo 
exchanges). As such, contribution limits are subject to something less than 
strict scrutiny. In contrast, expenditures are understood to constitute core 
political speech that may not be restricted, given the absence of an 
equivalent corruption concern. As a result, expenditure limits are evaluated 




Congress’ decision to prohibit foreign nationals from making both 
contributions and expenditures is a prophylactic effort to prevent foreign 
interference in our elections.
90
 This particular threat needs no further 
explication, as we continue to come to terms with the role that Russia 
played in the presidential election of 2016.
91
 Suffice it to say that the 
problem is multidimensional, and remedial efforts are ongoing.
92
 At 
present, I want to focus on the narrow question of whether the intentionally 
false campaign and election speech of foreign nationals might be regulated.  
The most significant precedent is Bluman v. FEC, which was decided by 
a three-judge panel of the United States District Court for the District of 
                                                                                                                 
 88. 424 U.S. 1, 20 (1976).  
 89. See generally Joshua S. Sellers, Contributions, Bribes, and the Convergence of 
Political and Criminal Corruption, 45 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2018) (providing 
background).  
 90. Bluman v. FEC, 800 F. Supp. 2d 281, 283 (D.D.C. 2011), aff’d, 565 U.S. 1104 
(2012) (“As money became more important to the election process, concern grew that 
foreign entities and citizens might try to influence the outcome of U.S. elections.”).  
 91. Nicholas Confessore & Daisuke Wakabayashi, How Russia Harvested American 
Rage to Reshape U.S. Politics, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 9, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
2017/10/09/technology/russia-election-facebook-ads-rage.html; Scott Shane, The Fake 
Americans Russia Created to Influence the Election, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 7, 2017), https:// 
www.nytimes.com/2017/09/07/us/politics/russia-facebook-twitter-election.html; OFFICE OF 
THE DIR. OF NAT’L INTELLIGENCE, ASSESSING RUSSIAN ACTIVITIES AND INTENTIONS IN 
RECENT US ELECTIONS (Jan. 6, 2017), https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/ICA_2017_01. 
pdf. 
 92. See Kenneth P. Doyle, Klobuchar Accuses Tech Companies of Stalling ‘Honest Ads’ 
Bill, BLOOMBERG BNA (Jan. 31, 2018), http://news.bna.com.ezproxy.lib.ou.edu/mpdm/ 
MPDMWB/split_display.adp?fedfid=127646275&vname=mpebulallissues&fcn=1&wsn=49
9879500&fn=12764627. 
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 The plaintiffs in the case—one a Canadian citizen, the 
other a dual citizen of Canada and Israel—desired to contribute money to 
political candidates, and, for one of the plaintiffs, to give money to the Club 
for Growth, a 501(c)(4) that expends money on electioneering 
communications.
94
 The plaintiffs challenged the applicable statutory 
prohibition under the First Amendment. The court initially engaged the 
question of the appropriate standard of review, acknowledging that the 
plaintiffs’ First Amendment rights were pitted against the Federal Election 
Commission’s purported national security concerns.
95
 Ultimately, however, 
the court decided to simply assume that strict scrutiny applied.
96
  
Despite this assumption, the court upheld the statute.
97
 The core of the 
opinion recognizes that the case “raises a preliminary and foundational 
question about the definition of the American political community and, in 
particular, the role of foreign citizens in the U.S. electoral process.”
98
 After 
summarizing the doctrine establishing the constitutional rights enjoyed by 
noncitizens, the opinion reviews the exception within that doctrine when 
foreign citizens seek to participate in activities that are “intimately related 
to the process of democratic self-government.”
99
 For activities of that 
type—the right to teach in public schools
100
 or the right to serve as a police 
officer,
101
 to give two examples—noncitizen exclusions are constitutional. 
Given those precedents, the court found, the right to make political 
contributions and expenditures could likewise be denied.
102
  
The court was careful to note that it did not perceive the statute to 
constitute a blanket restriction on the speech rights of foreign nationals.
103
 
Rather, it viewed the statute as a limited prohibition on “a certain form of 
                                                                                                                 
 93. 800 F. Supp. 2d 281 (D.D.C. 2011), aff’d, 565 U.S. 1104 (2012). 
 94. Id. at 285. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. at 285–86. 
 97. Id. at 292. 
 98. Id. at 286. “Foreign citizens” refers to noncitizens, some of whom may be lawful 
permanent residents. In contrast, the category of foreign nationals does not include lawful 
permanent residents.  
 99. Id. at 287 (quoting Bernal v. Fainter, 467 U.S. 216, 220 (1984)). 
 100. Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68 (1979). 
 101. Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291 (1978). 
 102. Bluman, 800 F. Supp. 2d at 288–89 (“In our view, spending money to influence 
voters and finance campaigns is at least as (and probably far more) closely related to 
democratic self-government than serving as a probation officer or public schoolteacher. 
Thus, our conclusion here follows almost a fortiori from those cases.”).  
 103. Id. at 290. 
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expressive activity closely tied to the voting process—providing money for 
a candidate or political party or spending money in order to expressly 
advocate for or against the election of a candidate.”
104
  
The “express advocacy” component is significant and was reinforced by 
the court’s assessment that the statute is not underinclusive in scope merely 
because it is silent on foreign nationals’ ability to make contributions and 
expenditures related to ballot initiatives: “Congress’s determination that 
foreign contributions and expenditures pose a greater risk in relation to 
candidate elections than such activities pose in relation to ballot initiatives 
is a sensible one and, in our view, does not undermine the validity of the 
statutory ban on contributions and expenditures.”
105
  
Bluman contains the key elements of an argument that some intentional 
lies by foreign nationals can be proscribed. Simply put, if foreign nationals 
are prohibited from making contributions and expenditures—rights that, 
especially in the case of expenditures, have enjoyed substantial 
constitutional protection—it naturally follows that their right to engage in 
intentionally false speech expressly advocating for or against the election of 
a candidate may be similarly regulated. Under the Court’s precedents, there 
is no discernible difference between literal speech and election 
expenditures.
106
 Standing on a street corner with a placard that reads “Vote 
for Jones!” is tantamount to giving $100 to a Super PAC that runs an 
advertisement with the same entreaty. Thus, telling an intentional lie that 
expressly advocates for or against a candidate—“Jones is a murderer! Vote 
for Williams!”—warrants no special solicitude merely because the speech 
involved is not financial in nature. If, as the precedents make clear, literal 
speech and election expenditures are analogous speech rights, then 
Congress may constitutionally deny foreign nationals the right to 
intentionally lie. 
The logic is straightforward. Intentionally false lies containing express 
advocacy are “intimately related to the process of democratic self-
government,”
107
 rendering potential appeals to the constitutional rights of 
noncitizens inapposite, and obliging the government to demonstrate only a 
                                                                                                                 
 104. Id.  
 105. Id. at 291.  
 106. See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 16 (1976) (“Yet this Court has never 
suggested that the dependence of a communication on the expenditure of money operates 
itself to introduce a nonspeech element or to reduce the exacting scrutiny required by the 
First Amendment.”).  
 107. Bluman, 800 F. Supp. 2d at 287 (quoting Bernal v. Fainter, 467 U.S. 216, 220 
(1984)). 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2018
158 OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 71:141 
 
 
rational relationship between its interest and its classification.
108
 Even if 
reviewed under strict scrutiny,
109
 though, Bluman makes clear that the 
government’s interest in this context is compelling.
110
  
Would laws of the sort I’ve described have a transformative impact on 
our politics? Almost certainly not. Nonetheless, given the severe distortion 
in our democratic discourse, and, again, in light of recent foreign 
interference in our elections, laws of this sort could be defended as a 
corollary to proposed legislation aimed at eliminating foreign influence by 
way of the internet. 
B. Campaign and Election Lies Intended to Undermine Election 
Administration 
A second circumstance in which regulations are justified is when 
intentionally false speech is used to undermine election administration. 
Election administration is an umbrella term referring to a variety of 
administrative matters. For instance, courts routinely resolve legal disputes 
involving voter registration,
111
 the effectiveness of various kinds of voting 
machines,
112
 and voter identification requirements,
113
 to give a few 
examples. These are election administration issues. Intentionally lying 
about such issues—those pertaining to what we might think of as the 
“machinery” of elections—threatens to compromise election integrity and 
should be prohibited. 
                                                                                                                 
 108. Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291, 296 (1978). 
 109. Let us imagine a court was persuaded by the reasoning in 281 Care Committee v. 
Arneson and Commonwealth v. Lucas that strict scrutiny must be applied to false political 
speech regulations. 
 110. Bluman, 800 F. Supp. 2d at 288 (“[T]he United States has a compelling interest for 
purposes of First Amendment analysis is limiting the participation of foreign citizens in 
activities of American democratic self-government, and in thereby preventing foreign 
influence over the U.S. political process.”); see Helen Norton, (At Least) Thirteen Ways of 
Looking at Election Lies, 71 OKLA. L. REV. 117, 121 (2018) (“[F]oreign speakers’ lies to 
influence American elections to their own advantage threaten especially grave harm to key 
constitutional values—particularly if we understand the First Amendment’s primary purpose 
as protecting speech that facilitates the United States’ democratic self-governance.”). But see 
Joseph Thai, The Right to Receive Foreign Speech, 71 OKLA. L. REV. 269, 298 (2018) (“[I]t 
at least remains an open question after Citizens United whether the government may exclude 
from the domestic marketplace of ideas the political speech of foreigners, as opposed to their 
campaign contributions and expenditures.”).  
 111. See Am. Civil Rights Union v. Phila. City Comm’rs, 872 F.3d 175 (3d Cir. 2017). 
 112. See Acosta v. Democratic City Comm., 288 F. Supp. 3d 597 (E.D. Pa. 2018). 
 113. See Greater Birmingham Ministries v. Merrill, 284 F. Supp. 3d 1253 (N.D. Ala. 
2018). 
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By way of example, imagine a poll worker intentionally provides false 
instruction about how to operate a voting machine. Or a situation in which 
campaign volunteers, engaged in get-out-the-vote efforts, intentionally 
mislead prospective voters, whom they believe to oppose their preferred 
candidate, about their voting eligibility. These lies are uniquely harmful. 
Professor Richard Hasen, after providing the example of an individual 
falsely informing listeners that “Republicans vote on Tuesday, Democrats 
vote on Wednesday,” sees little significance in such lies: “A state should 
have the power to criminalize such speech. The law would be justified by 
the government’s compelling interest in protecting the right to vote.”
114
 As 
Professor James Weinstein notes in his contribution to this symposium, and 
in making a similar point, “if government were powerless to stop such 
deception, the integrity of the election process might be badly 
compromised.”
115




More narrowly, when told by government officials, lies intended to 
undermine election administration unquestionably infringe upon the 
fundamental right to vote.
117
 If designed to advantage one political party 
over another, they also constitute an impermissible form of government 
partisanship that unconstitutionally burdens opponents’ political beliefs.
118
  
                                                                                                                 
 114. Hasen, supra note 22, at 71. 
 115. James Weinstein, Free Speech and Domain Allocation: A Suggested Framework for 
Analyzing the Constitutionality of Prohibitions of Lies in Political Campaigns, 71 OKLA. L. 
REV. 167, 223 (2018). 
 116. Id. (“[B]anning false statements about when an election will be held obviously will 
not deprive the electorate of valuable information or perspectives; nor will such a narrowly 
targeted ban ‘chill’ the expression of any useful information.”). 
 117. Helen Norton, The Government’s Lies and the Constitution, 91 IND. L.J. 73, 116 
(2015) (“In other words, these lies—like lies about the existence of, or consequences of 
exercising, constitutional rights more broadly—directly deprive targets of a constitutionally 
protected right for reasons that should fail strict scrutiny, and thus violate the Due Process 
Clause.”). 
 118. See Frederick Schauer, Not Just About License Plates: Walker v. Sons of 
Confederate Veterans, Government Speech, and Doctrinal Overlap in the First Amendment, 
2015 SUP. CT. REV. 265, 274 (“[I]f parties or officials in power use their control over 
government resources to secure their own reelection, the dangers to the democratic 
processes, and thus to larger First Amendment concerns, again seem apparent.”). Statutory 
relief, depending on the facts, may also exist. See Cal. Republican Party v. Mercier, 652 F. 
Supp. 928, 936 (C.D. Cal. 1986) (“The strongest case for allowing a § 1985(3) cause of 
action against a private conspiracy motivated by political animus would be where a private 
group tried to physically restrain an opposing political group from reaching the polls, or tried 
to coerce the opposing group’s votes when at the polls, or tried to destroy the opposing 
group’s ballots after the polling.”).  
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To be sure, government officials routinely make transparently partisan 
statements, some of which are deceptive. General statements of this sort are 
constitutionally unproblematic. But when government lies are intended to 
compromise electoral processes for political gain, constitutional concerns 
arise. Professor Michael Kang’s observation is instructive: 
To be clear, elected officials themselves are party actors free to 
politick and electioneer on a partisan basis in their individual 
capacities as citizens, candidates, and political figures. Nothing 
in a norm against government partisanship prohibits a party 
official from endorsing other candidates or campaigning along 
party lines, or advancing partisan priorities as a policy agenda—
such activities define democratic elections and public life. The 
distinction is that lawmakers cannot leverage official state action 
for such explicitly partisan activities.
119
 
Professor Helen Norton draws a similar—and, in my view, necessary—
distinction between “lies by an individual government official when 
expressing her own views in a personal capacity,” and lies made by an 
official empowered to speak for the government.
120
 The challenge, of 
course, is in enumerating official government actions.
121
 In sum, many 
intentional lies aimed at undermining election administration are already 
unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment, and if told with 
discriminatory partisan motives, also violate the First Amendment.  
But what about intentional lies told by private actors, along the lines of 
the examples provided above (poll workers, campaign volunteers, and the 
like)? While such lies might be thought to be less coercive than government 
lies, they also pose a serious threat to democracy. Although private 
individuals must be guaranteed ample freedom to speak on matters of 
public concern, I believe intentional lies meant to undermine the right to 
vote may be regulated. The Supreme Court, albeit in another context, has 
relaxed First Amendment rights when weighed against the right to vote.
122
 
Judicial deference is given to “generally applicable and evenhanded 
                                                                                                                 
 119. Michael S. Kang, Gerrymandering and the Constitutional Norm Against 
Government Partisanship, 116 MICH. L. REV. 351, 378–79 (2017). 
 120. Norton, supra note 117, at 76. 
 121. I am sympathetic to Professor Norton’s endorsement of a functional approach to this 
challenge. Id. at 89 (“I propose that government lies violate the Due Process Clause when 
they directly deprive individuals of life, liberty, or property or when they are sufficiently 
coercive of their targets to constitute the functional equivalent of such deprivations.”).  
 122. Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 210 (1992). 
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Time and again, the Court, in evaluating various election administration 
issues, has affirmed a government interest in avoiding electoral 
confusion.
124
 Notably, however, that interest does not encompass 
government attempts to categorically root out falsehoods. As put by Justice 
Marshall, “[a] ‘highly paternalistic approach’ limiting what people may 
hear is generally suspect.”
125
 It is for this reason that the comprehensive 
regulation of intentional lies in campaigns and elections is infeasible. Lies 
pertaining to policy issues, the likely effects of ballot measures, candidate 
voting histories, and candidate endorsements, while distressing, are 
protected speech, and attempts to regulate them would pose insurmountable 
enforcement difficulties. In contrast, lies pertaining to the “time, place, and 
manner” of elections are more readily verifiable, more threatening, and 
more constitutionally defensible in deference to states’ “interest in 
protecting the integrity, fairness, and efficiency of their ballots and election 
processes as means for electing public officials.”
126
 
C. Intentionally Lying on a Mandatory Disclosure Form 
The final circumstance in which regulations would be upheld is when a 
campaign or outside political group intentionally falsifies a mandatory 
disclosure filing. The Supreme Court has been more accepting of disclosure 
requirements than it has of limits on either contributions or expenditures.
127
 
Such requirements are evaluated under an “exacting scrutiny” standard, 
which requires the government to demonstrate a substantial relationship 
between the regulation and a sufficiently important government interest.
128
  
                                                                                                                 
 123. Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 788 n.9 (1983). 
 124. See, e.g., Eu v. S.F. Cty. Democratic Ctr. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 228 (1989) (“The 
State’s second justification for the ban on party endorsements and statements of opposition 
is that it is necessary to protect primary voters from confusion and undue influence. 
Certainly the State has a legitimate interest in fostering an informed electorate.”); Tashjian v. 
Republican Party of Conn., 479 U.S. 208, 220 (1986); Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431, 442 
(1970) (describing the state interest in “avoiding confusion, deception, and even frustration 
of the democratic process at the general election”). 
 125. Eu, 489 U.S. at 223–24 (quoting Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens 
Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 770 (1976)). 
 126. Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351, 364 (1997). 
 127. See infra note 130. 
 128. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 64 (1976). While an identical level of scrutiny is 
given to contribution limits, the Court has shown greater deference to disclosure laws than 
contribution limits. See, e.g., McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 196 (2003). 
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The disclosure landscape is complex, as candidates, political parties, 
outside groups, and donors are each subject to different disclosure 
obligations. A full treatment is outside the scope of this Essay.
129
 In general, 
however, recent disclosure challenges have involved the obligations faced 
by outside groups: 527s, 501(c)(4)s, and Super PACs. The exemption from 
disclosure that some of these groups enjoy distinguishes them from 
candidates and political parties: 
[A]ll three types o[f] organizations—Super PACs, 527s, and 
501(c)s—may engage in election-related spending without dollar 
limits and accept contributions to pay for that spending from 
individuals, corporations, and unions without dollar limits. Super 
PACs are subject to FECA disclosure of their donors, and 527s 
are subject to IRS disclosure of their donors, while 501(c)s are 
not required to publicly disclose their donors at all.
130
 
There are, of course, significant First Amendment concerns associated 
with mandating disclosure, and scholars have wrestled with the questions of 
whether disclosure requirements should be, and why they have been, 
upheld.
131
 There are also troubling findings about the effectiveness of the 
current disclosure regime.
132
 Nonetheless, disclosure requirements remain a 
widely used device for regulating modern politics.  
                                                                                                                 
 129. For a detailed introduction, see SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF ET AL., THE LAW OF 
DEMOCRACY: LEGAL STRUCTURE OF THE POLITICAL PROCESS 531–48 (5th ed. 2016); Michael 
D. Gilbert, Campaign Finance Disclosure and the Information Tradeoff, 98 IOWA L. REV. 
1847, 1854–58 (2013). 
 130. Briffault, supra note 23, at 1649; see also ISSACHAROFF ET AL., supra note 129, at 
544 (“[C]andidates, parties and traditional PACs must obey [statutory] disclosure and 
disclaimer rules, while some types of outside groups do not.”). 
 131. See, e.g., Richard L. Hasen, Chill Out: A Qualified Defense of Campaign Finance 
Disclosure Laws in the Internet Age, 27 J.L. & POL. 557, 560 (2012) (“[D]isclosure laws are 
much better than nothing in ferreting out when an elected official might act to benefit her 
supporters rather than act in the public interest.”); Gilbert, supra note 129, at 1853 (“Perhaps 
disclosure is better understood as a regulatory problem that requires the kind of detailed, 
contextual cost-benefit analysis administrative agencies carry out in other areas of law.”); 
Helen Norton, Secrets, Lies, and Disclosure, 27 J.L. & POL. 641, 654 (2012) (“We should 
understand disclosure and disclaimer requirements as more likely to further, rather than 
frustrate, First Amendment values when they regulate speakers who seek to keep secrets 
(and occasionally tell lies) to manipulate listeners’ choices and thus threaten their 
autonomy.”).  
 132. Jennifer A. Heerwig & Katherine Shaw, Through a Glass Darkly: The Rhetoric and 
Reality of Campaign Finance Disclosure, 102 GEO. L.J. 1443, 1499 (2014) (“Standing alone, 
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This undoubtedly results from the Court’s acquiescence to disclosure 
laws. In Buckley v. Valeo, the Court identified three government interests 
that justify disclosure requirements. The first interest is an “informational 
interest.”
133
 As expressed, “[t]he sources of a candidate’s financial 
support . . . alert the voter to the interests to which a candidate is most 
likely to be responsive and thus facilitate predictions of future performance 
in office.”
134
 The second interest is in “deterr[ing] actual corruption and 
avoid[ing] the appearance of corruption by exposing large contributions and 
expenditures to the light of publicity.”
135
 The third interest is in policing 
circumvention of contribution and expenditure limits.
136
 Each of these 
interests is premised on the importance of establishing a healthy 
marketplace of ideas for voters.
137
 
The informational interest identified in Buckley remains decisive.
138
 In 
both McCutcheon v. Federal Election Commission
139
 and Citizens United v. 
Federal Election Commission,
140
 the Court’s most recent major campaign 
finance cases, the Court spoke approvingly of the informational benefits 
provided by disclosure.
141
 To that end, “[d]isclaimer and disclosure 




                                                                                                                 
more disclosure will not work. Disclosure needs to be very different, and much better, if it is 
to achieve the goals the Supreme Court has articulated for it.”).  
 133. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 81. 
 134. Id. at 67. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. at 67–68. 
 137. Sarah C. Haan, Voter Primacy, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 2655, 2663–64 (2015) (“The 
critical idea behind Buckley’s analysis of FECA’s disclosure provisions was that voters use 
campaign finance information to make voting decisions. The Court’s analysis was voter-
centric, looking at each disclosure requirement from the perspective of a voter evaluating 
candidates.”).  
 138. Id. at 2664 (“Buckley laid the groundwork for all of the Court’s subsequent analysis 
of the informational interests supporting compelled registration, recordkeeping, disclaimers, 
and reporting, and it remains today the most detailed elucidation of the informational 
interest.”).  
 139. 134 S. Ct. 1434 (2014). 
 140. 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
 141. McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1460 (“With modern technology, disclosure now offers a 
particularly effective means of arming the voting public with information.”); Citizens 
United, 558 U.S. at 369 (“Because the informational interest alone is sufficient to justify 
application of § 201 to these ads, it is not necessary to consider the Government’s other 
asserted interests.”). 
 142. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 366 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 64 (1976)). 
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Whatever right to lie was recognized in Alvarez is inapposite in the 
context of mandatory disclosure. The government has a longstanding and 
substantial interest in providing information to voters about where a 
candidate’s financial support is coming from. Permitting a donor to lie on a 
mandatory disclosure form would directly undermine that government 
interest. As courts have held in rejecting purported rights to anonymous 
political speech, the government interest “extends more generally to 
promoting transparency and accountability in the electoral process.”
143
 
Additionally, as with election administration, the government has a 
substantial interest in protecting the integrity of the political process. 
Finally, in Alvarez itself, Justice Kennedy acknowledged the legitimacy of 
the federal statute criminalizing the making of a false statement to a 
government official
144
—a statute that undoubtedly prohibits the inclusion of 




Lying in campaigns and elections is harmful to democracy. As we now 
know all too well, people are often highly, and perhaps uniquely, 
susceptible to political lies.
146
 It is, therefore, tempting—even intuitive—to 
promote their elimination. Few would argue otherwise. But to delegate 
authority over the regulation of lies to the government presents risks that 
are far from trivial.
147
 In this Essay, I have explored three circumstances in 
                                                                                                                 
 143. Doe v. Reed, 561 U.S. 186, 198 (2010); see also Citizens United v. Schneiderman, 
882 F.3d 374, 383 (2d Cir. 2018) (“But totalitarian tendencies do not lurk behind every 
instance of a state’s collection of information about those within its jurisdiction. Any form of 
disclosure-based regulation—indeed, any regulation at all—comes with some risk of abuse. 
This background risk does not alone present constitutional problems.”).  
 144. United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 720 (2012). 
 145. United States v. Rosen, 365 F. Supp. 2d 1126 (C.D. Cal. 2005); see also United 
States v. Mattox, 689 F.2d 531, 533 (5th Cir. 1982) (“Silence may be falsity when it 
misleads, particularly if there is a duty to speak.”). 
 146. See Scott Shane, How Unwitting Americans Encountered Russian Operatives 
Online, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 18, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/18/us/politics/ 
russian-operatives-facebook-twitter.html; see also HANNAH ARENDT, CRISES OF THE 
REPUBLIC 6 (Harcourt Brace 1972) (1969) (“Lies are often much more plausible, more 
appealing to reason, than reality, since the liar has the great advantage of knowing 
beforehand what the audience wishes or expects to hear.”). 
 147. See RODNEY A. SMOLLA, FREE SPEECH IN AN OPEN SOCIETY 4–5 (1992) (“A society 
that wishes to take openness seriously as a value must therefore devise rules that are 
deliberately tilted in favor of openness in order to counteract the inherent proclivity of 
governments to engage in control, censorship, and secrecy.”).  
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which campaign and election lies can be regulated. My suggestions are 
modest. My suggestions are unlikely to transform the state of our politics. 
But there is value in delineating what is permissible within the boundaries 
of the First Amendment as we work towards enhancing our democratic 
discourse.  
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